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Abstract
Cognitive neuroscientists habitually deny that functional neuroimaging can furnish causal information about
the relationship between brain events and behavior. However, imaging studies do provide causal information
about those relationships although not causal certainty. Although popular portrayals of functional
neuroimaging tend to attribute too much inferential power to the technique, we should restrain ourselves from
ascribing it too little.
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Functional Neuroimaging Can Support Causal Claims
about Brain Function
Matthew J. Weber and Sharon L. Thompson-Schill
Abstract
■ Cognitive neuroscientists habitually deny that functional
neuroimaging can furnish causal information about the relation-
ship between brain events and behavior. However, imaging stud-
ies do provide causal information about those relationships—
although not causal certainty. Although popular portrayals of
functional neuroimaging tend to attribute too much inferential
power to the technique, we should restrain ourselves from as-
cribing it too little. ■
It is a healthy truism that secure inference in cognitive
neuroscience requires converging methods. The brain is
enormously complex, and vital knowledge about it has
arisen at vastly different spatial and temporal scales, through
observational methods as well as natural and engineered
interventions. In light of the fieldʼs distinguished origins in
lesion studies and single-unit neurophysiology, functional
neuroimaging is too readily ceded pride of place in the
canon of cognitive neuroscience methods—but that does
not license its critics or its practitioners to invent limitations
on the technique. Functional imaging is many things, but
despite the familiar shibboleth, it is not merely correla-
tional.1 Imaging studies provide causal information, al-
though not causal certainty, about the influence of brain
activity on behavior. Moreover, the influence on brain ac-
tivity of experimentally manipulated variables, such as stim-
uli and task instructions, is unarguably causal.
The popularity of brain stimulation techniques in cogni-
tive neuroscience is rising, and researchers often justify
using these techniques by invoking the inability of func-
tional imaging to address causal matters (Iacoboni, 2009;
Ruff et al., 2008; Wagner, Valero-Cabre, & Pascual-Leone,
2007; Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2006).
These justifications can be misleading. For example, Uddin
et al. (2006) state that “functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) provides only correlational information about
the relationship between a given brain area and a particular
cognitive task. Causal relationships between brain and be-
haviour can be tested with [transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS)].” To say that “fMRI provides only correlational
information” is to render inexplicable the utility of fMRI-
guided TMS, which relies on the reasonable expectation
that areas activated concurrently with task performance are
likely to be causally involved in the task. On the other hand,
the causal involvement of a given brain region in a task is
no guarantee that the region implements the computation
of interest in a given experiment; for example, diverse tasks
across the domains of attention, memory, language, and
cognitive control would suffer from well-targeted TMS to
primary visual cortex.
We suspect that a key factor confusing this issue is the
difference between correlational and merely observational
information. When we observe two variables, neither of
which is experimentally manipulated, we are powerless
to assign causal influence. Some information from func-
tional imaging studies has this character—for example,
the relationship between brain activity and reaction times,
preferences, or demographic variables. Likewise, because
functional imaging studies do not manipulate brain activity
directly, they cannot capture causality when the variables
of interest are both neural. Miller, Vytlacil, Fegen, Pradhan,
and DʼEsposito (2010) show that disruption of lateral
prefrontal cortex activity changes category selectivity in
extrastriate cortex, a causal observation that could not be
supported by fMRI alone. However, it is common to ma-
nipulate subjectsʼ perception or behavior and measure
brain activity at different levels of that manipulation. This
experimental structure informs us about the influence of
behavior on brain activity—which is not identical but un-
questionably relevant to influence flowing the other way.
Sarter, Berntson, and Cacioppo (1996) provide a useful
framework with which to interpret the information gained
from imaging experiments versus studies of lesions and
brain stimulation: The latter inform us about P(B[ehavior] |
A[ctivity]), whereas imaging studies testify to P(A | B). On
this account, functional imagingʼs informativeness about
causal hypotheses becomes clear: P(B | A) increases with
P(A | B) via Bayesʼ rule.2 Having construed conventionally
“causal” and “correlational”methods in a symmetric prob-
abilistic framework, Sarter et al. acknowledge “a fundamen-
tal asymmetry in the heuristic power” of these studies thatUniversity of Pennsylvania
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favors the former. We are content with this concession,
merely adding that the advantage obtains only once we
know where to stimulate or which patients to test.
One might object that the claim “functional imaging is
merely correlational” does not deny these points—rather,
it denies only that functional imaging by itself can provide
certainty about the causal influence of brain activity on
behavior. We doubt that the claim is often construed this
narrowly, but thus read, it is of course accurate. However,
it is plain that some functional imaging studies are spe-
cifically interested in the relationship between stimulus
presentation or task-related behavior and brain activity.
Atkinson and Adolphs (2005) claim that “functional im-
aging techniques support only correlational rather than
causal claims about brain function,” but they review several
studies reporting that confronting participants with certain
facial expressions elicits activity in amygdala, anterior in-
sula, and striatum—a causal relationship. Several groups
have shown that machine learning algorithms, applied to
cortical activity evoked by visible lines and those masked
into invisibility, can read out the orientation of those lines
(Haynes&Rees, 2005; Kamitani &Tong, 2005); to claim that
the brain activity they observedwas not causedby the stimu-
li is to invalidate their work. Likewise, clinical studies some-
times seek to differentiate patient populations from one
another or from healthy controls by observing differences
in task-related brain activity. Fales et al. (2008, 2009) re-
ported elevated amygdala activity in depressive patients
viewing fear-related stimuli compared with controls in the
same condition and separately that antidepressant medica-
tion normalizes prefrontal hypoactivity in depressives per-
forming an emotional-interference task. To claim that the
observed brain activity was not caused by the behavior is
to negate the possibility of understanding the depressive
brain as it interacts with the world in both the lay and the
statistical senses to limit inference to the general tendency
or main effect. However, these scientists have done better.
There is no need to slight their contributions by making in-
accurate disclaimers about their methods.
We acknowledge that, in general, the problemwith func-
tional imaging lists the other way. Both grant reviewers
and the popular media are keenly interested in the brain–
behavior relationships about which imaging research must
remain tentative, and we often do not meet these enthusi-
asms with appropriate moderation. In addition, it is es-
sential that cognitive neuroscientists be clear about the
comparative strengths of nonimaging techniques. Still, to
demean any of our methods cavalierly is to weaken the
reputation of the whole field. Let us be forthright about
our capabilities as well as our limitations.
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Notes
1. Readers preoccupied with moral purity are encouraged not
to look up one authorʼs reference to “the correlational nature
of functional neuroimaging methods” (Thompson-Schill et al.,
2002).
2. Poldrack (2006) offers a fuller treatment of Bayesian infer-
ence from neuroimaging data.
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